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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Cross-border surrogacy 
transactions (CBST):
Can consumers’ states choose whether or not to 
regulate?
Whether surrogacy is ethical or not is subject to lively 
debate. But so far, it is the prerogative of each sovereign 
state to decide whether to allow or forbid in its territory the 
provision of surrogacy treatments, according to its own 
national values. However, when citizens’ personal values and 
interests do not go hand in hand with the chosen regulation 
of their home state (consumers’ state), globalization enables 
them to exercise their reproductive freedom through the use 
of surrogacy markets abroad. At the moment these cross-
border surrogacy transactions (CBST) are unregulated and 
states can choose if they wish to address the issue or not. 

Establishing a CBST framework is more attractive to 
consumers’ states that morally accept at least some sort of 
commercialization of surrogacy services than to states that 
defend a more restrictive policy and will see a contradiction 
between the concept of commercialized surrogacy services 
and their national public policy. In this post I argue that 
whether states allow, fund, restrict or forbid these services, 
regulating the global aspect and trans-border effects of 
surrogacy transactions is not a choice but, from a global 
justice perspective (cf. also Benvenisti; Abizadeh), rather a 
bioethical duty. Recent jurisprudential developments also 
indicate that states have positive duties.
Many developed countries have conservative regulations, 
banning surrogacy altogether (e.g. Australia, China, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, 
Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and some U.S. states). 
Some have imposed partial bans (Brazil, Greece, Israel, and 
the UK). Some countries allow surrogacy by statute (Israel, 
Ukraine and Russia). Finally, some states in the US, for 
example, have practically a laissez-faire policy, permitting 
commercial surrogacy and the sale of egg cells. The more the 
access to surrogacy services is limited in a country, the more 
people are tempted to go abroad in order to access these 
services in other countries, where the policy is less 
restricted. However, cross-border surrogacy transactions are 
usually unaddressed in consumers’ countries, until their 
citizens come back with the resulting child.
The lack of harmonization between countries with regard to 
the registration of the legal parenthood and nationality of the 
child raises administrative opportunities for consumers, but 
also difficulties (cf. e.g. Busby). Problems may arise when the 
child needs travelling documents and the legal parenthood of 
the intended parents is yet to be determined, or when 
consumers’ states refuse to acknowledge the status of a child 
born as a result of a transaction that does not meet the 
national public policy standards. Politically, it may be hard for 
countries that completely ban the supply of reproductive 
services to acknowledge the consequences of a market that 
they consider intrinsically unethical or wrong.
Some efforts are currently being made on a diplomatic level 
to address this problem by informing citizens about the 
consequences of such transactions, or asking foreign clinics
that they cease providing surrogacy options to a state’s 
citizens unless consumers had consulted with their embassy 
on these matters first. In order to better balance the 
interests of the concerned actors, the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (HCCH) is currently investigating
the prospects of the adoption of international instruments on 
cross-border surrogacy transactions.  However, beyond 
these voluntary initiatives, I argue that states have a duty, not 
a choice, to regulate CBST that their citizens are involved in. 
The duty of surrogates’ countries to regulate transactions is 
clear, because CBST occur in their territory and affect their 
own women. The duty of consumers’ countries is less 
obvious. As I argued elsewhere, there are three ethic-legal 
arguments explaining why consumers’ states must regulate 
CBST.
Risks and human rights violations
First, while offering an answer to the fertility problems of 
citizens of consumers’ countries, evidence shows that cross-
border surrogacy transactions often entail risks and human 
rights violations, particularly in lower-income countries, 
which are the common destination for CBST. The 
transactions can detrimentally affect the human rights of all 
parties involved: Most often, surrogates’ health rights and 
their rights over their bodies are violated and their autonomy 
and right to choose are not recognized. In the absence of 
clear international standards or coherent rules, the global 
industry depends on private contracts. Such contracts, which 
are the result of negotiations between individual parties from 
different countries with unequal bargaining power, tend to 
distribute risks and benefits unfairly. The process does not 
meet proper standards of informed consent to enter the 
process, the signing of the contract is done under 
questionable circumstances, the medical treatments and the 
extensive control to which surrogates are subjected to 
gravely limit their autonomy violating their right to privacy, 
autonomy, equality, health and making the terms of the 
contract are unfavourable.
Health risks entailed by CBST also have secondary impact for 
states that go beyond the individual transaction. Medical 
complications for surrogates might burden healthcare 
systems in destination countries where the complications 
occur. The children born from the procedure might receive 
unsatisfactory care, might have no clear nationality status 
due to a lack of legally recognized parenthood, or import 
diseases into the consumers’ country, which will have to 
internalize these medical harms.
A duty to regulate
Second, from an international law perspective, it is the state 
on whose territory the legal and medical procedures are 
carried out that can take regulative measures regarding the 
conduct of the market, the regulation of clinics, and the 
protection of human and health right. However, from a global 
justice perspective, this approach falls too short. Lower-
income countries, where transactions occur, often refrain 
from taking action, either due to insufficient resources, or 
because of political unwillingness, due to a minimalist 
conceptions of what rights entail and what the country’s 
commitments are or because the rulers prefer keeping their 
subjects impoverished, dependent, and hence exploitable 
(see, e.g. Chapman and Cohen). Without exempting the 
responsibility of destination countries, I argue that 
consumers’ states encourage the market and should 
therefore de lege ferenda be assigned duties to regulate it.
Consumers’ states restrictive policies encourage the cross-
border surrogacy market. Whether states choose to fund 
reproductive treatments as part of their health policy, to 
forbid or to restrict them, these treatments are inaccessible 
at least to some patients who need them, unless purchased in 
the market. In states that do not provide reproductive 
services as part of their health policy, such treatments are 
totally left to the market sphere. However, even in states that 
allow the use of reproductive services, eligibility is often 
limited due to the need to allocate resources between 
medical treatments, or due to the costs of these services, 
which pose a financial obstacle. Citizens who cannot fulfil 
their reproductive freedoms nationally use the global market 
as some sort of compromise. Since these policies are within 
the authority of consumers’ state, I argue that states should
be responsible for their consequences.
Treaty obligations and recent jurisprudence
Finally, both human rights treaty law and recent decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) imply that in 
order to find a practical solution, consumers’ states might 
have a duty to regulate CBST to some extent.
By insisting on national values, states risk infringing 
international children’s rights according to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (CRS). States must ensure that 
their national law is in accordance with their obligations 
according to the human rights regime. As part of CRC, any 
child has a right to be registered immediately after birth (art. 
7), to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name 
and family relations as recognized by law, without unlawful 
interference (art. 8), to enter their own country with his or 
her parents (art. 10), and not to be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his or her privacy and family (art. 
16). The CRS states that a Contracting State shall grant its 
nationality to a person, not born in the territory of a 
Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the 
nationality of one of his parents at the time of the person’s 
birth was that of that State (art. 4). According to this 
convention, a state may refuse to register a child who is 
registered in the destination country or in another country. 
Such a refusal will not leave the child stateless, and will not 
necessarily be considered a violation of human rights (cf. also 
Ergas). However, when the citizenship laws in destination 
states do not grant citizenship to the resulting child (e.g., in 
Russia), a refusal by consumers’ countries to register the 
child might violate the child’s right to citizenship. Aside from 
all the above mentioned considerations, refusing to register 
children born out of cross-border surrogacy transactions 
would discriminate against these children compared to other 
genetically connected children, which is a violation of art. 2 
of the convention on the Rights of the Child, and a 
disproportionally harsh response.
Along these lines, in recent decisions such as Mennesson v. 
France, Labassee v. France, and Paradiso and Campanelli v. 
Italy, the ECtHR addressed the refusal of consumer states to 
grant legal recognition to parent-child relationships 
established through CBST. At the moment, according to the 
ECtHR ruling, as long as the parentage is legally established 
in the country of birth, the international obligations under 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) of the 
authorities to the best interests of the child outweighs the 
alignment with national public policy or even with insistence 
on safe and secure procedures that comply with surrogates’ 
rights.
In the Mennesson v. France case, the French authorities 
refused to acknowledge a birth certificates according to The 
French Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths, in spite of 
judgments given in the US that the intended parents were 
the children’s legal parents. Although it was lawful in the 
United States, the Court of Cassation dismissed the parents’ 
claim, holding that it was contrary to the principle of 
inalienability of civil status, and void on public-policy 
grounds under the French Civil Code. Relying primarily on 
the right to respect for their private and family life 
guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR, the couples brought the case 
before the ECtHR. The Court ruled that such interference 
would be in violation of Article 8 ECHR, unless it was ‘in 
accordance with the law’, ‘pursuing a legitimate aim(s) listed 
in Article 8’, and ‘necessary in a democratic society’, which 
was the case regarding the parents. While the parents’ rights 
were not violated, the court found that the children’s rights 
to respect for their private life, were. Since nationality and 
the right to inheritance are relevant elements of identity, the 
state’s action was irreconcilable with the best interests of the 
child principle. Consequently, the state was obliged to legally 
recognize a parent-child relationship established abroad 
through CBST.
In January 2015, another decision concerning CBST was 
issued by the ECtHR in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. 
Italy, where the parents claimed that the refusal to recognize 
the legal parent-child relationship and the removal of the 
child by Italian authorities from their care violated their right 
to respect for private and family life. The case of Paradiso
was different from the above-mentioned, in the sense that 
the child concerned was genetically unrelated to either of the 
intended parents. The Italian authorities addressed it as 
international adoption rather than a CBST. Even as such, the 
Court recognized that the Italian authorities failed to take 
account of the child best interest principle, given there had 
been a de facto family life between the child and the intended 
parents. Nevertheless, although the removal of the child 
indeed violated the applicants’ rights, the child could not be 
returned to the applicants as he had in the meantime settled 
with his foster parents and it was the child’s best interest to 
stay with them.
In conclusion, states are free to decide whether to allow or 
forbid domestic surrogacy transactions. Yet, given that 
consumers are interested in CBST, and due to states’ 
involvement in encouraging the cross-border market and 
registering the resulting children, states have at least an 
ethical if not even a legal duty to cooperate internationally in 
order to have cross-border markets regulated and 
monitored.
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